SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND THE EU'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY

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Abstract:

The EU as well as other major international organizations have increasingly placed a link between security and development policies at the centre of their foreign policy. Yet, profound controversy over the value and practical consequences of such a link exists. In this paper, we aim at disentangling the various dimensions of the security-development nexus. We attempt to order the debate, investigate current claims of the relation between security and development, and investigate in how far current policy response are sufficient and whether they imply a superiority of security or of development measures. We argue that thinking the security development nexus requires us to rely on non-dogmatic, non-paradigmatic ideas, to accept the contingency (or uncertainty) of our knowledge, and to address in analytical and policy practice situation-specific problems.
Our discussion is structured in four sections. The first section carves out some accessible routes of the conceptual jungle of the security-development nexus. We discuss the underlying concepts of *Security* and *Development* briefly, and three major frameworks (*Peacebuilding*, *Human Security*, and the *Global War on Terror)* The second section discusses a range of claims that have been made in the framework of the Security Development Nexus. We shall investigate the vicious circle argument and the threatening character of underdevelopment on a global, regional and national level. What follows from this discussion is that hardly any claim goes uncontested. In other words, our knowledge about the dynamics is limited, and we should treat any claim to secured knowledge with suspicion. Section three firstly introduces the major policy responses. Those responses can be meaningful differentiated in, one, architectural responses – the re-organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures –, two emergency responses policies – tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as emergency situations –, three, long-term structural policies directed towards prevention and re-construction – policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge of the outbreak of conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term violent state. We shall discuss, the policies in the light of whether the responses lead to a subordination of development policies, to the dissolution of meaningful security strategies, and whether they increase efficiency and effectivity. Section four, concludes in arguing the need for pragmatic problem solving strategies.

Keywords: Security-Development Nexus; Fragile States, Coordination, Securitzation

1. Introduction: Disentangling the Security-Development Nexus

Since the beginning of the 1990s, major international organizations and governments have emphasized the nexus between security and development and underlined the need to link security and development policies. For instance, the fifth principle of OECD DAC's *Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States* recognizes:

> "(...) the political-security-development nexus: The political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others. International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level." (OECD DAC recommendation nr.5 of the principles of good international engagement in fragile states
> http://www.opml.co.uk/extranet/ppfs/principles/5_recognise_the.html)

All the major security and development documents of the EU point to a linkage between security and development. The recent *European Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*, for example, emphasizes this point:

> "As the ESS [European Security Strategy] and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace" (European Council Report on the implementation for the European Security Strategy 2008:12)

Some prominent international initiatives – drawing on the 2005 *Paris Declaration* on aid efficiency and the proposals and commitments of the Accra High Level Forum, leading to the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) –, like *The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-Building* –organized jointly by OECD DAC and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office – stress the need to develop realistic objectives "that address the root causes of conflict and fragility" (AAA 2008) by bringing together "different policy communities (development, defence, diplomacy)" (UN Peacebuilding Support Office 2009:2). These actors all stress the importance of linking security and development policies in addressing conflict and fragility.

As such, the link between development and security is nothing new. In fact, since the inception of the notion of development at the end of the 1940s, security concerns and motivations have been deeply influential in development policies. In the U.S., the 1947 Marshall Plan and Truman doctrine, some of the influential post-World War II initiatives in postwar development policies later transferred to Asia, Africa and Latin America, have been shaped not only by economic motives but most significantly by vital security considerations (Leffler 1992, 157-164). When the U.S. Congress merged together economic and military aid in October 1951, the new development policy was called the "Mutual Security Program" and, in 1963, the U.S. President's study group concerned

with foreign aid was officially called "The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World." (Packenham 1973: 25-58) The security dimension of development aid, while contested (see notably, Banfield 1963, 4-36), remained strong throughout the Cold War. Influential British economist and major figure of development studies Ernst Friedrich Schumacher also emphasized in the mid-1970s that only genuine development could avoid the threat of violent revolutions (Duffield 2001, 35).

Still, what actually constitutes this linkage between development and security, its characteristics and its consequences for the European Union, remains elusive and disputed. The notions of development and security are broad and often ill-defined and the link between them can refer to many different, potentially contradictory, ends and means. Moreover, the nexus between security and development is criticized as an attempt to subordinate help to poor people to the short term security concerns of Western nation states and their elites. Connecting development and security might also turn virtually everything that happens in fragile countries into a security threat for the European Union, making it difficult to assess the relative importance of these threats, to develop a clear focus and to design appropriate strategies. However, the possibility to improve the connection between development and security can also be a major opportunity for the EU in order to achieve greater policy coherence among heterogeneous policy fields which could lead to greater efficiency of its development policy. Thanks to such a better coordination it should become possible to break the vicious circle between insecurity and poverty, and to implement a policy agenda that aims at removing the root causes of conflict.

There are also disagreements on the current state of policy coordination between development and security. For some, the international merging of development and security agencies and policies has already been a fact of life for some time as administrations, academics, military establishments, NGOs, private security companies, etc. have morphed into an inclusive, organic and transparent network (Duffield 2001, 35-36). For others, however, the coordination between development and security agencies and policies in the EU is fraught with difficulties, has barely started and should become one the key policy priority for the future (Support Study 2009). For the EU, the overlap between development and security also raises sensitive political and legal questions of demarcation of powers between the Pillars. The attribution of policy instruments to the Union's Security and Defense Policy or to the Community's development policy has major implications for the applicability of the Community method or intergovernmentalism and these issues will persist even if the Lisbon treaty comes into force (Hoffmeister 2008).

In this paper, we aim at disentangling the various dimensions of the security-development nexus in the European Union development policy and, in so doing, presenting and discussing the current state of the policy and academic research in that domain. We develop five main arguments.

First, since the early 1990s, many different approaches, concepts and categories have been linking security and development. Policy-makers and analysts are facing complex

conceptual landscape which needs to be clarified. This situation is fostered by the fact that concepts proliferating under the same name tend to have different meanings. For example, Human security and Peacebuilding suggest different links between security and development, and they come in a narrow and in a broad version.

Second, since the beginning of the U.S.-led 'Global War on Terror' (now officially called the Long War), development policies have been re-evaluated and several threats to the security of Western states, including the EU, have been related to situations of fragility. Policymakers and analysts have argued that less developed states and situations of fragility might breed terrorism, facilitate piracy and more generally create instability in the international system. While this re-framing of the security implications of situations of fragility might be problematic, it is not clear that it has led to crucial practical changes in European development policies. The securitization of development policies should not be overestimated. Moreover, development has always been related to political and security projects and this should be kept in mind if relief, aid and assistance are evaluated.

Third, development practitioners have been at times exaggerating, in their own way, security threats in order to get political attention, particularly in the framework of human security. Yet, not only do development practitioners and scholars have come to recognize that the security justification of development policies has been partially overstretched, also more flexible concepts point out that meaningful country-specific development and security strategies remain possible for the EU.

Fourth, linking security and development through "whole of the EU" approaches has certainly benefits for more efficient policies, notably in avoiding the most glaring contradictions. Yet, coordination and administrative integration are not the only ways to cope with challenges of fragility and conflict. We underline the limits of current coordination and integration efforts and the importance of relying on pragmatic, problem-oriented ideas, rather than to fall back on "grand schemes of improvement" (Scott 1998).

Five, the notion of vicious circles suggesting that protracted fragility and conflict is to be explained by an equilibrium of under-development and insecurity is a valuable (albeit not new) perspective. Yet, the related policy agenda aiming at addressing root causes by state- and nation- building policies has its limits. Policy-makers and analysts' causal knowledge might be too limited to pursue confidently this agenda. This raises the need to think in more flexible terms, and consider other medium-term political measures that go beyond addressing root cause. Often addressing the root causes cannot help to change the life of populations in zones of fragility and conflict immediately. More emphasis can be put on political negotiations and short and medium term arrangements which might not necessarily follow the long term objective of building a state.

In short, borrowing from Albert Hirschman's classic analysis of development policies, we argue that in dealing with the security-development nexus, the EU's action would benefit from: "(...) a little more 'reverence for life', a little less straitjacketing of

the future, a little more allowance for the unexpected – and a little less wishful thinking." (Hirschman 1970: 239)

Our paper is organized in four sections.

The first section carves out some accessible routes in the conceptual jungle of the security-development nexus as a response to situations of fragility. We present the underlying concepts of Security and Development and then turn to the three major frameworks linking security and development: *Peacebuilding*, *Human Security*, and the *Global War on Terror (GWOT)*. We suggest that these approaches can be sorted in two ways: whose security they take as a referent object and how they argue for the convergence or divergence between security and development.

The second section discusses the main claims that have been made regarding the security development nexus. We investigate the vicious circle argument, i.e. the threatening character of underdevelopment on a global, regional and national level. We also emphasize that the existing knowledge about these dynamics remains limited, and that basing policies on isolated claims might be problematic.

Section three introduces the major policy responses of the security-development nexus. Those responses can be differentiated into architectural responses (the re-organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures), emergency responses policies (tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as emergency situations), and long-term structural policies directed towards prevention and re-construction (policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge of the outbreak of conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term violent state). We discuss these policies in the light of whether the responses lead to a subordination of development policies, to the dissolution of meaningful security strategies, and whether they increase efficiency and effectivity.

Section four, concludes in arguing the need for pragmatic problem solving strategies.

2. What is Security? What is Development? How are they Related?

2.1. Two ambiguous concepts: Security and Development

The link between security and development is difficult to assess in part because the notions of security and development themselves are fuzzy and changing. As Richard Young observed,

> "interviews with policy makers reveal that as this link has been placed increasingly at the centre of EU foreign policy it has engendered notable discrepancies over basic definitions of what constitutes 'development' and what constitutes 'security'." (Young 2008: 426)

Both security and development are relational terms, inviting policy-makers and analysts to ask, among other things, whose security, and whose development they are concerned about. While all the conceptual difficulties might not be solved, a brief conceptual history of both terms will clarify the issues.

Security and Development: Brief Conceptual Histories

In policy-making, both security and development are of relatively recent origins as they have been developed and increasingly employed in the aftermath of the Second World War (Huntington 1971, Escobar 1995, Rist 1997, Waever 2006).

Ole Waever (2004, 2006, Buzan and Waever 2007) suggests that in the 1940s the concept of security "moved to the centre becoming the guiding idea over previously supreme aims like defence and national interest" (Buzan and Waever 2007: 386). During the Cold War, the core security concerns were nuclear policies of nuclear, the prevention of inter-state war and preservation of national integrity, as well as the geo-strategic positioning in an evolving balance of power. In sum, the dominant understanding of security emphasized national integrity (national security), military and defense policies which included an increased focus science and technological (nuclear weapons and conventional weapon systems).

Early ideas of development emerged out of post-World War II U.S. initiatives such as the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe and Truman's *Fair Deal* (Huntington 1971, Escobar 1995, Rist 1997). The Marshall Plan was directed, in Marshall's own words, against "hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos" which is as good a definition of fragility as any. American leaders feared that poverty and hunger would make Western European countries vulnerable to Communist appeals. However, although the Marshall Plan was part of the containment of Soviet expansionism, Congress initially prohibited the use of Marshall Plan assistance for military supplies. It is also important to note the Marshall Plan's legacy has been institutional as well, from the Committee on European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), in charge of the distribution of Marshall Plan funds in Western Europe, to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) founded in 1961, envisioned in part as continuing the Marshall Plan with developed market countries joining the United States as donors and with states in the developing world to be the recipients.

While initially associated to Cold War U.S. foreign policy, development partially differentiated itself from political and security concerns in the 1970s. Part of this differentiation led to a de-politicization of development policies (Huntington 1971). The three core components of this understanding of development were as follows: under-development is a problem of poverty, poverty is defined in terms of Gross Domestic Products and per-capita income, and the emphasis on economic measures (such as credit, currency, or market reforms). While development was conceptualized as an inter-state affair, the multilateral institutions of development, gained in importance.

Enlarging Security and Development

With the end of the Cold War, both the notions of security and development were broadened.

The notion of security was enlarged for three main reasons (Buzan 1983). First, the easing of the tensions between the superpowers allowed for concerns and priorities other than nuclear deterrence and the risk of a major conventional war in Europe. Second, the increasing recognition of economic interdependence and the importance of resources led to different security concerns (Daase 1991). Third, there was also an increasing recognition that the major security concerns were only of limited relevance for most developing countries. In consequence, security was widened to cover, beyond military issues, economic, environmental and political stability, as well as deepened concerning not just states but individuals, regions, minorities, humans, companies, etc.

Development was equally broadened, in part because the results of previous development policies had been disappointing. The concept was widened moving from pure economic issues to include institutions, such as property regimes, and governance and regulating institutions and stretched further to cover well-being or happiness. Development was also deepened recognizing the importance of regional integration, sub-state actors (social capital), as well as households (as a unit of analysis) and, as expressed in the human development paradigm, humans.

These debates about the broadening of security and development continue as the two notions refer to different needs and interests.

Approaches to Security and Development

By security, we mean the absence of threats to central values and the absence of fear that such values will be threatened (Wolfers 1962). By development, we mean the improvement of men and women's capacity to achieve their human potential, individually and collectively. The main objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the eight Millenium Development Goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce the mortality rate of children, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development (European Consensus 2005).

These are working definitions providing a preliminary identification of the themes in discussion, not attempts at capturing abstract essences. Both security and development ultimately refer to the objective of human well-being and we are fully aware what constitutes human well being is contested. Furthermore, security and development suggest different sets of historically grown, institutionally embedded and legitimized

practices, different repertoire of actions (Der Derian 1995, Huysmans 1998, Esteva 1992). Moreover, framing policy problems as being problems of security or as development (or both) allows for a certain kind of understanding and of actions. Raising the question of what can be done with the security tool box and what can be done with the development toolbox can be a productive way out of seeing security and development either as convergent or divergent objectives.

Different issues can be framed as security and/or development issues (Buzan et al. 1997, Waever 1995, 1998): (1) referent object: whose security or development are we concerned about? (2) issues: What is the issue that threatens the object? What is the issue that constraints the object? (3) measures: What are the measures that can protect the object from the threat? What are the measures that can remove the constraint from the object?

2.2. Organizing the Debate on the Development-Security Nexus

The existing academic research and policy analysis on the development-security nexus can be organized in two dimensions. First, whose security and whose development is concerned: this is the question of the major referent objects. Second, the scope of security and development (from limited to wide).

Whose Security? Whose Development? Referent Objects

As part of the deepening debate of security and development a range of referent objects other than the nation state have been identified. While none of the existing approaches explored below centers exclusively on one referent object, they can be categorized by which referent objects they include and which they exclude (or marginalize). Figure one differentiates between referent objects.

Figure 1: Referent Objects

The first axis is between an international/global level and a sub-state level. While we do recognize the limits of a domestic/foreign distinction (given the deterritorilization processes of globalization, e.g. through diasporas, global flows of capital, and the role of multilateral organizations, as well as the changing status and value of sovereignty), we nonetheless think such a distinction is helpful.

The second axis distinguishes between the major donors and contributors ("the North") and to the major aid receivers or those regions immediately affected by SDN politics ("the South") (on the limit of this distinction: Weiss 2009).

In the international domain we differentiate between a global referent (meaning references to global stability, "international peace and stability", "the international community", global markets and trade relations), a regional one (referring to a territory which comprises of several states, or to a regional organization (EU, AU, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC), and a state referent (referring to UN recognized nation states).

In the domestic domain we identify the following referents: the regime (referring to the government in power, meaning a political faction having control over the capital as well as over major national infrastructures), the people or the population (understood as an aggregation of the individuals living in a state territory), groups (as referring to any kind of self-organized social, economic or political unit, not limited to cities, villages, interest groups, companies, ethnicities, clans, tribes, or networks of organized crime) and individuals (referring to persons living in a state territory or holding formal citizenship of the state).

Scope, Convergence and Divergence

Our second major category considers the scope of security and development and whether there is a some compatibility between the two. Figure two projects these dimensions as a graph.

Figure 2: Convergence, Divergence and Orthodoxy

The first axis considers whether primacy is given to security or development. By the primacy of security regarding ends and means, including military force. With the primacy

of development, the focus is mainly on classical development goals and tools (such as expert assistance, credit, financial aid or relief).

The second axis refers to the different ideas in how far security and development toolboxes are compatible with each other. Positions that argue for a complete convergence might suggest that existing organizations and practices can be in principle integrated through reforms. These transformations could in the long run mean reforms, such as the transformation of military organizations into civil-military intervention forces, or the re-organization of government from separate ministries of foreign affairs, development and defense into one (e.g. a ministry of crisis prevention, or of human security). Another position would recognize that security and development are historically grown institutions and practices, which are for practical or logical reasons distinct from one another but not incompatible. The emphasis here is not on integration, but on coordination, understood as the organization of the relations of formally independent units. Yet another position might emphasize that the gap is much wider between knowledge, practices and institutions and that even coordination might be, except under the most exceptional circumstances, a tremendously difficult task (see in particular: Komer 1972; Hunt 1995).

We now put this framework to the task by exploring the current state of the academic and policy debates by analyzing three approaches of the link between security and development: peacebuilding, human security, and the war on terror. We shall give a brief historical introduction to the emergence of each approach, discuss the controversies and different versions, and close with a summary explaining how each approach fit into our categorizations. This is important not only for the sake of conceptual clarity, but also to avoid mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings among practitioners.

2.3 The Security-Development Nexus in Peacebuilding

In a broad sense, peacebuilding refers to discourses and practices that aim at creating or facilitating peace. The notion of peacebuilding has two main origins. The first is the writings of the peace researcher Johan Galtung, notably his 1975 article on "three approaches to peace". The second is the UN reports "Agenda for Peace" (1992) and 1995 "Agenda for Development" (1995) produced under the auspices of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. While the concept did not feature high on the political agendas in the early 1990s, it gained traction in the late 1990s, with the re-emphasis on the concept by the influential Brahimi Report (1999 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the "Brahimi Report" after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi), and the creation of a new inter-governmental organization devoted to Peacebuilding, the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, following the recommendation of the High Level Panel on Threats Challenge and Change (2005) and the 2005 UN World Summit.

The concept is widely used and is one of the major frameworks of thinking the security-development nexus. As Michael Barnett and his colleagues (2007: 35) observe, "an impressive number of organizations contribute to the cause of ending and preventing

deadly conflict and use the concept to frame and organize their postconflict activities". Drawing on an analogy to the *Washington Consensus* on Development, Richmond (2004, 2005) goes as far as arguing that meanwhile something like a "Peacebuilding Consensus" has evolved. He suggests, that

> "There seems to be a general agreement upon 'peaceful' strategies used to respond to conflict involving international organizations, institutions, agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but less so on the issue of the use of force. The outcome of this process is projected as a construction of liberal democracy, with a free market and globalized economy, progressive development strategies, and guaranteed human rights. […} It [the Peacebuilding Consensus] has been deployed in most post-Cold War interventions, where the stated objective was rarely less than opening the way for free and fair elections from Cambodia in the early 1990s to Kosovo at the end of the decade." (Richmond 2004:132)

While Richmond is right in pointing out that a broad consensus has evolved that peacebuilding incorporates a wide range of measures centered around the establishment of liberal democracy free and globalized markets and human rights, two different ideal conceptions of peacebuilding proliferate.

One conception in the legacy of Boutros-Ghali introduction of the concept understands it as referring to activities in-between conflict (civil war, genocide) and the employment of a peacekeeping force on the one side, and broader development (or statebuilding) strategies on the other. This understanding, which we refer to the narrow version of Peacebuilding conceptualizes it as a concept referring to the transition from conflict-policies to development-policies.

The second ideal-typical version, which we shall refer to as the broad version of Peacebuilding, follows the footsteps of Galtung's understanding. Here the focus is on wider, encompassing strategies that can prevent and manage conflict and help to maintain peace. In other words, this understanding promotes the idea of peacebuilding as a development strategy with a conflict-sensitive component. The narrow version sees Peacebuilding as one set of measures in the overall strategy towards fragility, differentiating it from other tools such as peacekeeping, prevention, state-building and development policies. The broad version, in turn, largely equates Peacebuilding with development policies towards fragility, while adding a distinct security component to it. Let us briefly investigate both versions.

The narrow version of Peacebuilding

Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace defined peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." Peacebuilding was understood as an independent issue serving to complement the UN's activities in peacemaking (understood as diplomatic activities) and peacekeeping (understood largely as military activities). As explained in the Supplement

to an Agenda for Peace the essential goal was "the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace."

As developed in the Supplement to the Agenda (1994) and the Agenda for Development (1995) the underlying logic can be summarized as: diplomats can 'prevent' and 'make' peace, soldiers can 'keep' the peace, others have to 'build' it. Peacebuilding was initially associated with democratization (the creation of democratic structures), meaning pivotally the organization of elections (see above) and the concept was understood as restricted to post-conflict engagement, following sequentially a peacekeeping mission.

The Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding similar. But reflected on the extension of mandates of peacekeeping operations. Peacebuilding was understood as

> "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques." (PUNPO para 14).

The motivation of the definition of the Brahimi Report is clearly seen as a response to the practical challenge on how to organize the relation of military and civil components of a peacekeeping mission. The framework of Peacebuilding was here used to organize civil-military coordination in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

A widely used (narrow) definition is given by Roland Paris (2004: 38). He defines peacebuilding as

> "action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from a civil war".

In sum, in such a definition Peacebuilding is clearly limited to activities that take place in locations after a major conflict has ended and as figure three aims to highlight, peacebuilding is seen as a sequence of different activities addressing conflict.

Figure 3: The Narrow (Sequential) Version of Peacebuilding

Conflict (Civil War, Large Scale Violence, Genocide)	→	**Intervention** (**Peacekeeping**, Protection of Civilians)	→	**Peacebuilding** (Civil and Military)	→	**Development**

The main critiques towards such an understanding stress that it is unclear when a conflict or civil war actually has ended, that it is problematic to separate (mainly military) peacekeeping activities from (mainly civil) peacebuilding activities, as often violence can immediately break out again although a situation has been declared as post-conflict (as in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC)) (Autussere 2009). Also it has been argued – by advocates of a wider understanding (e.g. Tschirgi 2004) – that contrasting peacebuilding with the independent activities of statebuilding and peacekeeping actually hinders the close coordination between those activities.

The broad version of Peacebuilding

Galtung (1975) argued to distinguish between three conceptual approaches of creating peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. In Galtung's terms peacebuilding referred to the development of structures "that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." This encompassing understanding of Peacebuilding formed, as Beatrice Pouligny (in Peacebuilding Initiative 2008) puts it "intellectual antecedents of today's notion of peacebuilding: an endeavor aiming to create sustainable peace by addressing the 'root causes' of violent conflict and eliciting indigenous capacities for peaceful management and resolution of conflict." Such a wider understanding of peacebuilding that focuses on structural policies and does not follow a sequential understanding was for instance laid out by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report defined two different types of peacebuilding. The first type of "peacekeepers as peacebuilders" refers to the confidence building measures, the deterrence of the outbreak of new violence and policing (para 221-223). The second type "the larger peacebuilding task" refers Peacebuilding to situations when peacekeepers have left a territory and suggests that the concept entails

> "Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector service delivery can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding. This should be reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial

institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long-term policy and funding." (para 229)

This understanding sees Peacebuilding as a more encompassing term which aims not at organizing the civil-military components of a peacekeeping mission in the aftermath of conflict only, but centrally aims at integrating all different kinds of policies directed at the prevention of conflict and coping with fragility (see figure four).

Figure 4: The broad Version of Peacebuilding

Critiques of such a wide understanding (e.g. Paris in Rocha Menocal and Kirkpatrick 2005:767) point out that "defining peace building to include such a wide range of development, security, and governance assistance makes it very difficult to distinguish causes and effects" and that a blurring of agendas does little to prevent and cope the outbreak of large-scale violence.

Summary

Peacebuilding is broad framework that has been primarily developed and used in the context of the UN. The main emphasis is on coping with the challenges of reconstruction in a post-peacekeeping phase, while in practical terms the concept has pivotally been used to strengthen coordination efforts between the various agencies that operate in post-conflict environments. Rather than suggesting specific policy priorities or arguing for a specific relation between security and development measures, the concepts primary function is to facilitate debate and coordination on post-conflict issues in a flexible manner.

The proliferation of the concept of peacebuilding needs to be seen as a response to two developments. Firstly, the practice of widening UN peacekeeping mandates to cover different aspects of political, societal and economic reform up to the organization of interim administration, going far beyond traditional mandates of monitoring or peace

enforcement. This widening increased the need for having integrated frameworks to organize missions and to coordinate with the other actors (than DPKO led armed forces) involved in post-conflict activities. Secondly, the conclusion of a negative record of peacekeeping efforts. While the question of the overall record of peacekeeping remains highly contested among academics (depending crucially on how success and failure are measured) , the results of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacekeeping (Smith 2004) and the 2003 report of the World Bank (Collier et al 2003) raised awareness that a high number of countries that had been object of peacekeeping efforts relapsed into conflict within five years. The relapse problem raised recognition that more needs to be done, and that activities need to be better coordinated.

A divergence among different understandings of peacebuilding exists (Barnett et al 2007), concerning notably two aspects: a) whether the term should refer to post-conflict situations (meaning largely post peacekeeping engagement) alone, or also include preventive measures applicable in situations of fragility or risk of conflict; b) whether peacebuilding should be interpreted in a narrow sense, as referring to measures which have immediate impact on security situations, or if it is to be understood as more encompassing in referring also to medium and long term projects in fields such as infrastructure, health, unemployment and education, and address the "root causes" of conflict.

While both understandings of Peacebuilding take the state and populations in conflict zones as the main referent object, they clearly divide in what way they give priority to security concerns. It is in the narrow understanding that security concerns are prioritized (cp. table one).

Table 1: Broad and Narrow Concepts of Peacebuilding

	Narrow	Broad
Situations	Post-Conflict	"Risk" of major violence
Measures	Kick-off	Analysis, early-warning, prevention, re-constructing
Major Challenge	Civil-military Coordination (Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding)	Prevention
Primacy?	Security	Development
Convergence?	No	Yes
Major Referents	"South", Regions, State, Regime, People	"South", Regions, States, Regime, People, Groups, Individuals

2.4 The Security-Development Nexus and Human Security

A framework of integrating development and security thinking, which stems primarily out of development discourses, but also gained a strong foothold in security circles, is the framework of human security. The main idea of Human Security is that the major referent object of security concerns should be the "human". Human Security has

been largely developed as an attempt to replace orthodox security. What are the needs of humans, how can they be guaranteed and how those needs can be delivered remains however deeply contested.

The term "human security" was the first time brought prominently on the international agenda by UNDP in the frame of its 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994), which was drafted for the 1995 World Summit on Social Development. The 1995 Copenhagen declaration, the outcome document of the World Summit, officially embraced it as a guiding concept for development work. The UNDP Report was drafted by a small team around economist Haq, prominent for his concept of human development – attempting to widen the notion of development as referring to different types of entitlements (cp Gaspers 2005). Haq's proposal was clearly motivated strategically, as he saw a chance for redirecting the resources, which had been bound by cold war security, for development purposes. The 1994 Report understood human security as

> "first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities" (UNDP 1994: 23).

The Report suggested that security should refer to seven sectors, namely it should address economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security.

Two governments, Canada and Japan, became major proponents of human security and both adopted it as a guiding principle for their foreign policy (Werthes and Debiel 2007). To some degree, the further formulation of the concept can be read as a conceptual race between Canada and Norway on the one side and Japan and UNDP on the other. Canada advocating for a narrow understanding (focused on "freedom from fear") and Japan for an extended one (as also including "freedom from want") On Canadian and Norwegian initiative in 1998 the Human Security Network (HSN) was founded, a network of like-minded states and transnational activist groups coordinating their actions under the header of Human Security on a regular base. The group convenes once a year at the level of foreign ministers, and the ministers also meet every year during the Session of the UN General Assembly.

Associated to it the so called "Friends of Human Security", an even more loose network of various agencies with interest in human security, hold regular meetings. The HSN defined: "In essence, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives" (HSN 2009).

The concept was used as a reference in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (Matthews et al. 2007) where it served to argue for the importance of the security of individuals, which leading to the 1997 Ottawa Convention. In addition, the campaign for

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was carried on under the flag of human security. In both cases the HSN was a major advocating group.

The Japanese government in turn funded in 1999 a Human Security Trust Fund as part of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Human Security was broadly referenced in the intellectual work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2000-2001). From 2001 to 2003 an independent commission was installed to further develop the concept. The Commission on Human Security, funded mainly by the Japanese government was co-chaired by development economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. Human security is defined by the Commission

> "as protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity." (CHS 2003:X)

Human security was referenced as a core principle for UN activities in the Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP 2003-2004) and the 2000 and 2005 Reports of UN secretary general Kofi Annan "We the people" and "In larger Freedom" set the stage to institutionalize human security.

Broad and Narrow versions

While in the conduct of this process, an identifiable concept Human Security was manufactured, different interpretations or versions of it circulate. There is divergence over three dimensions. This concerns firstly the content of human security. "While all proponents of human security agree that its primary goal should be the protection of individual human lives, they differ as to what the individual should be protected from" (Shani 2007:4). This leads to differentiating between a narrow and a broad understanding. The narrow understanding claims to prioritize insecurities and to include only physical or military threats to survival. The broader understanding aims to integrate a wider range of threats and centrally adds non-physical aspects and notions of injustice, such as economic (mis-)distribution, socio-cultural (mis-)recognition and political (mis-)representation.

Secondly, conceptions of human security differ over who the subjects of human security are. One version prioritizes the territorial state. In upholding Westphalian sovereignty it is claimed that states have to be the primary provider of security for people and if states fail to do so, groups of states have to intervene to protect them. A second version attempts to give primacy to people protecting themselves and stresses the role of non-state or sub-state organizations in assisting them to do so. Thirdly, human security is

either conceptualized in negative or in positive terms. The negative one understands security as the absence of threats, usually framed by understanding security as 'freedom from a threat'. The positive one defines security as the existence of possibilities to protect, usually framed in terms of 'empowerment' or 'emancipation'.

The different understandings, we only provide here a sketch of, are advocated by or attached to different communities. For instance, a narrow, state centred, negative version has been associated with Canadian activities and the Human Security Network. Also, military organizations (such as the US military or NATO) tend to make use of such a narrow understanding. The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (discussed below) centrally relies on the idea of a narrow understanding of human security. The wider, non-state centred, negative version is supported by Japan, finds foothold in development communities and is centrally advocated by the UN. The positive version is mainly attached to academic communities such as the Welsh School in Security Studies (Booth 2007), but also to (cosmopolitan) political theorists and philosopher communities more broadly. A clear-cut differentiation of versions and agencies makes however only partially sense, at least if the criteria of usage is applied. For instance, the Human Security Network, heavily borrows, as Gaspers (2005) notes, from a broader understanding, which is confirmed given that it engages in issues such as health. Hence, we cannot conclude that any community is fully attached to one version of human security. Rather situations define which actors use which version.

Summary

While peacebuilding has evolved as a relatively pragmatic, UN sponsored framework centred on issues of coordination, human security is a framework that has spurred much more controversy. The reason is initially that the framework does not aim at amending, coordinating or integrating existing security and development thinking and practice, but has been understood as argument to replace and challenge existing security conceptualization. Opponents of the concept point out that the concept is too broad and ambiguous for either analytical purposes or policy guidance. For instance, Roland Paris (2001, 2004) argues that human security distracts analysts from a proper understanding of strategic affairs (2001: 88), that human security is "sprawling and ambiguous", a "hodgepodge of principles and objectives" (2001:92), is "so vague" that it verges on the meaningless (2001: 101) and does not help policymakers, who want to know what to do.

Despite this general rejection of human security on epistemological or policy-related grounds, the more promising controversy has evolved around the question of the relation of a (traditional) state-centric understanding of security and the people-centred understanding underlined by human security. Traditional security analysts argue that human security is no true challenger to state security, as states remain the major providers of people's security. Yet, as human security advocates hold against this position, it is the case that states are the major security providers in the Western and developed sphere, while it is not in the case of weak statehood, where it is often the state that presents intentionally (e.g. through political oppression or politics of ethnic divisions) or unintentionally (e.g. through inaction or lacking institutional capabilities) the major threat

for the security of people. The solution or balancing act between those two position has been to understand human and state security as complementary, and to suggest the need for a focus on human security (and international intervention) for cases when there is a mismatch between state and people security, and emergencies arise for which states internally do have no way to respond – which is the solution outlined in the frame of the "responsibility to protect".

Table 2: Broad and Narrow Concepts of Human Security

	Narrow	Broad
Situations	Physical threats to survival	"Freedom from want"
Measures	Protection of civilians	Whole range of security and development policies
Major Challenge	Sovereignty concerns	Intervention
Primacy?	Security	Development
Convergence?	No	Yes
Major Referents	"South", Regions, State, Regime, People	"South", States, Regime, People, Groups, Individuals

2.5. The Security-Development Nexus and the Global War on Terror

While peacebuilding and human security are children of the 1990s, suggesting either a pragmatic framework for "doing better" (peacebuilding), or attempting to shift international policy resources towards development (human security), a third framework of connecting security and development has emerged as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th: The Global War on Terror (GWOT). The fact that the 9-11 attackers organized in Afghanistan, a weak state, led to a major re-evaluation of poverty, under-development and weak statehood by security analysts. 9-11 marked a paradigm shift for (even the most traditional) security analysis, as it became evident that international security could not be longer thought and addressed as a question of inter-state affairs, but that due to the transnational character of threats, security had to be addressed in global terms (Buzan 2007).

GWOT spurred a different kind of connection between security and development. While the major referent objects of peacebuilding and human security are the people living in underdeveloped states or respectively in under-developed regions, in the GWOT framework the major referent is global stability, and in extension the security of Western, developed states. As Beall et al (2006) argue this revision of the security-development nexus did not only affect the US, which always had been more inclined to view development policies as part of larger strategic considerations, but the majority of Northern States. While such a frame initially provides a better legitimation for justifying resources for intervention (as the link between underdevelopment and security is more immediate), the emphasis is on whether and how which underdeveloped states constitute

a threat for global security. Under this conceptualization the least developed states, now projected as "failed states" were conceived as a major threat to security.

Yet, current research does not support a direct causal link between underdevelopment (state failure) and transnational threats (e.g. Hehir 2007, Patrick 2007). While some country cases ranked as the least developed countries, indicate that state failure can be a significant source of global threats (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan), others show only a weak link (e.g. Burundi, Malawi).

Indeed, for many analysts "the idea of failed states as a security threat is […] an exaggerated one" (Chandler 2006:189-90). Yet, relative little empirical analysis has been conducted on the link between state failure and transnational threats. As Patrick (2007: 644) puts it: "What is striking is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security threats." The most pervasive threat of this kind, backed up by the case of Afghanistan, is terrorism. Prominent is the safe-haven argument, the claim that underdeveloped states provide the breading grounds for global terrorism. The threat menacing the international community derives from sub-state groups that thrive on the conditions endemic in fragile states. In the frame of GWOT, however, the underdevelopment-global insecurity link has also been widened as covering other issues. Crucially this has been the case of armed robbery at sea and piracy. Piracy, an issue becoming emergent in 2007 and 2008 with major global initiatives being taken, has been directly linked by some analysts to terrorist activities. While GWOT is a powerful international agenda, especially advocates of a peacebuilding framework (e.g. Tschirgi 2003) have expressed concerns that GWOT channels resources towards military rather than development expenses. Moreover, as it is argued GWOT directs attention to immediate strategic threats, rather than to an overarching, long term involvement.

Summary

GWOT can be seen as the current most influential framework fostering the link between development and security as the emergency and threatening character of underdevelopment comes to the fore. In the framework there is clearly the idea that development activities should be subordinated to the strategic and tactic goals of security thinking due to the construction of state failure as a threat. Yet, given the change in strategy in the paradigmatic case of engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the balance sheet might be turning.

2.6 Summary

In this section we discussed three major approaches for thinking security and development as interdependent. While all of these frameworks underline to think about security and development in broad and holistic terms, the difference between them lay clearly in the way in which they prioritize security or development thinking and measures. Both peacebuilding and human security are controversial in the sense that

immanent in both frameworks is the controversy how far into the broader development agendas the framework should be stretched – and indeed if the general development agenda should still be separated. As argued peacebuilding is the more pragmatic framework in this regard, less centered on conceptual issues, but more problem-centered. Human security has initially been a clear pull towards development, yet also in this case controversy between a broad and narrow school persists, and it is doubtful that these controversy can be settled by any means of conceptual discussion. For the case of GWOT we find a clear tendency to integrate security and development with the purpose to subordinate the development tool box under strategic needs.

The concepts can be sorted along two axes: first, the way they give primacy for security or development thinking, second, the way in which suggest that security and development thinking are sets of practices, which converge (suggesting they can be "integrated") or diverge (suggesting that they need to be "coordinated") (see figure below). Concepts of a converging character stress the need for transforming security and development organization into a coherent set of policies to form a new field of foreign policy. Concepts with an underlying view of divergence, in turn, point to the different histories of both fields (notably the history of military organizations as war fighting organizations) and emphasize the need for organizing the dialogue between the fields through coordination as well as drawing clear boundaries between them.

Figure 5: SDN Frameworks

Concerning the referent objects underlying each conceptions, we also see significant differences.

Figure 6: Referent Objects of SDN Frameworks

It is important for the discussion of policies towards fragility and conflict to keep these difference in conceptualizations in mind. Often the different meanings of concepts are not clarified. The several documents of the EU, for instance the Review Paper on the European Security Strategy (European Council 2008), gives reference to all three frameworks, it mentions the terrorist threat and its link with fragility and conflict, it refers to peacebuilding and to human security. Yet especially the meaning of human security and peacebuilding is not further defined.

3. Security and Development: What do we know?

In this section, we examine some of the claims associated with the security-development nexus. What do we actually (think we) know? While we cannot discuss all the controversies carried out in the numerous disciplines and subdisciplines investigating issues relevant to the security-development nexus – like development economics, development studies, post-development studies, international relations, security and strategic studies, military sociology, international law, psychology, anthropology and sociology -, we focus on the most significant claim regarding the relation between fragility and insecurity. We argue that our knowledge of these complex dynamics remain limited.

Following our framework of different referent objects, we structure our discussion in moving from the Northern spectrum (nation states) via global concerns, to regional concerns and finally the substate dimension which makes up the major part of our discussion. While we attempt to cover as many issues (ranging from military to societal issues, table two provides an initial overview), we will not cover all aspects that could be considered as relevant. In these cases, or where we find a general lack of either reliable or accessible studies, we shall refer the reader to additional references.

Table 2: Examples of Referent Objects across Issue Areas

	National	**Regional**	**Global**	**Security Issues**	**Development Issues**
Military	Integrity of Territory	Regional Stability	Global Stability	Invasion, Transnational terrorism	Security Sector Reform
Economic	Welfare/ Markets Resources	Regional Markets, Resources	Global Financial Markets, Trade	Financial Fraud, Transnational Organized Crime	Welfare, Growth, Unemployment, Infrastructure
Society	National Identity	Regional Identity	Human Rights	Migration, Minority Rights	Social Cohesion, Equality
Environmental	National Environment	Regional Environment	Global Environment	Climate Change, Desertification Pollution, Environmental Crime	Pollution
Political	Integrity of Regime	Integrity of Regional Organization (EU, AU)	International Norms (Sovereignty)	Revolutions and Military Coups, Intervention Non-Compliance	Participation, Working Governance Structures

3.2 The Global Link Between Security and Development

Do situations of fragility, and of underdevelopment more generally, significantly affect the security of the EU? As summarized by Hehir 2007 and Patrick 2007, the overall finding of the research devoted to the broad link between underdevelopment and security is that there is no direct causal link between fragility and global threats. Some countries are undoubtedly sources of politically stated threats, others are not. Some country ranked as the least developed countries, indicate that fragility can be a significant source of global threats (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan), others show only a weak link (e.g. Burundi, Malawi). Moreover, not all of the threats associated with fragility are significant. Organized crime activities, such as cyber crime, financial fraud or the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions are hardly to be found in failed states. In sum, for many analysts "the idea of failed states as a security threat is […] an exaggerated one" (Chandler 2006:189-90).

Yet, relative little empirical analysis has been conducted on the link between fragility and transnational threats and risks. As Patrick (2007: 644) puts it: "What is striking is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security threats." The majority of analysis so far has investigated the link between terrorism and state fragility.

Fragile States and Terrorism

Terrorism is the most pervasive threat linked to state failure. The evidence for such a link is based on the case of Afghanistan. Yet generalizing from the Afghan case, in which the Taliban regime provided an operational base for Al Quaeda, is problematic. The general claim that underdeveloped, fragile or failed states provide the breading grounds for global terrorism and given international operating terrorist groups a safe haven is not statistically supported. As the literature indicates, the connection between state weakness and transnational terrorism is more complicated and tenuous than often assumed (Newman 2007, Stewart 2007, Hehir 2007). Not all fragile and failed states are afflicted by terrorism. Terrorist groups have emerged from, and operated within, countries which have strong, stable states and a variety of systems of government as well. They operate in fragile and failed states but it is not necessarily the condition of fragile or failed statehood, which explains their presence. Moreover, fragile and failing states may be of declining importance to transnational terrorists, given that terrorist have diffused in more global networks with autonomous cells in dozens of countries which might be poor and wealthy (see e.g. Korteweg 2008, Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). While further analysis is needed on the conditions the gives rise to global terrorism, existing research suggests caution towards making a general claim that state fragility causes terrorism and orienting policy towards fragility at the fight against terrorism.

Failed States and Piracy

A second, more recent link between state failure and global threats has been made by the issue of piracy. The recent activities of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden suggests that failed states give piracy organizations an operational base. The dimensions that piracy has reached in this region (with major oil tankers and even weapon deliveries hold hostage), and the significant naval response of the international community (with UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and the EU sponsored anti-piracy operation Atalanta) indicate that here indeed a major threat to the security of the global market, to the property of shipping companies as well as the personal security of seamen (though it is reported that seamen have been generally treated well) exists. Yet, again the literature suggests caution towards generalizing from the Somalian case. As Nincic (2008), in the major statistical exploration of the state failure-piracy link so far, suggests, state Failure is a necessary but not a sufficient conditions for pirate activities. Which conditions of underdevelopment favor piracy and armed robbery and how this activities link with international terrorism is an underexplored issue (Nincic 2008).

Non-Democracy as a Threat

A different and often more implicit link between state failure and global threats has been made in the frame of linking democracy or good governance and peace. The argument, centrally promoted since the beginning of the 1990s by US administrations starting under Clinton, but shaping UN, NATO and EU strategy (Rasmussen 2001, Owen 2005, Russett 2005, Bueger and Villumsen 2007) has been that democratic states are peaceful in their relation to each other, and in extension non-democratic states present major global security threats. Fragility and state-failure has been defined as the absence of democratic structures, and in consequence these states are threats to global security. Yet, while the positive link between democratic governance and peaceful relations is backed by statistical evidence (and even has been declared a "fact") this is hardly the case for the negative link. In other words non-democratic states are not necessarily a security threat. Moreover, as Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 1996) suggest adolescent and democratizing states might be more war-prone (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996). Concluding from the evidence on democratic peace that non-democratic states are a threat is hence problematic.

3.3 Vicious Circles and the Root Cause Agenda

While research on the causes of violence and war has a long-standing tradition (e.g. Wright 1942), emphasis shifted in the 1990s towards the study of civil war, given the increasing diagnosis that the majority of wars were no longer fought between states, but within states. Also civil war could no longer be explained in reference to colonial independency or the cold war super power struggle. It has been mainly two traditions or schools which have shaped the debate and constitute today the mainstream on the cause of civil war, state failure, and fragility (cp. Woodward 2007). This is firstly a cultural-economic school centered on research teams, such as the World Bank team led by Paul Collier or the Minority at Risk project. Secondly, a political-regime school, centred on democratic peace research, already briefly discussed. Both of these schools today feed into a contemporary mainstream model that projects countries as being catched in a vicious cycle of poverty and insecurity, and which suggests that policies towards civil conflict and fragility should be directed at removing the causes identified by the two schools. Let us briefly discuss the main arguments by both schools.

The cultural argument projects wars as being fought over the political consequences of cultural differences. The causes of war are hence cultural (or ethnical) differences and discrimination of (culturally defined) minorities. Culturally divided societies or societies of repressed minorities (Kaufman 1996, Gurr 1993). The cultural argument has been translated into a policy agenda, which lays high emphasis on power sharing agreements, regional autonomy and mechanisms of minority protection.

The economic argument suggests that civil war is caused by rebels seeking economic gain (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001). Rather than cultural differences the main cause is here seen in the motivations of maximizing gain and in the opportunity structures in which rebels have the condition to finance and sustain a rebellion against a government. Policies following the economic causes argument have either aimed at

economic sanctions or other regulatory measures to hinder the financing of conflict (e.g. the Kimberly Process), or in the immediate post-conflict situation at establishing resource management systems and security sector reform (Pugh et al 2004).

The political-regime argument sees the main cause for civil war in authoritarian rule or in the absence of democratic government structures. Authoritarian regimes or weak states live in what has been described as the insecurity-dilemma. Regimes need to use violence to secure their power, while this violence causes in turn more resistance to the regime (Jackson 1999). Democracy is projected as the best mechanism for non-violence conflict resolution and seen as a preventive mechanism (Rummel 1995). The regime argument has led to policies placing emphasis on creating democratic structures to prevent conflict and help to sustain post-conflict peace agreements (Smith 2003, Guiholt 2007).

All three arguments have shaped the policy responses towards fragility, state failure and civil conflict considerable and form part of what can be summarized as the root causes agenda towards fragility. Yet, while current policies are directly inspired by this research, more recent investigations firstly shed doubt on these earlier results, and secondly, suggest that policies directed towards these three root causes might even be counter-productive. As Susan Woodward (2007:154) argues,

> "current policies tend to be based on research that has been superseded […]. If effective peacebuilding depends on addressing 'root causes' and the knowledge on which these policies are based is wrong, then our intervention may do more harm than we would by ignoring the causes altogether"

Let us briefly discuss the research that criticizes earlier finding internally and those studies that suggest a different agenda than a focus on root cause.

The cultural difference argument has been challenged by research such as that of Fearon and Latin (2003) and Sambanis (2000). Ethnically heterogeneous societies are less inclined to civil war than homogenous ones. Moreover, recent research shows that conflicts related to cultural difference are so situation-specific that little can be followed from large-N statistical analysis (e.g. Posner 2005). As argued by Suhrke and colleagues (2005) the economic argument also suffers from serious methodological constraints including coding errors, that the conclusions drawn from this research are hardly reliable. Scholars studying the microdynamics of violence and civil war suggest moreover that incentives and opportunity structures are hardly a sufficient explanation (e.g. Kalyvas 2006).

The political regime (or democratic) argument has been considerably challenged by results that suggest that less developed states, with intermediate levels of democracy have the highest level of political repression and violence (Regan and Henderson 2002). Some scholars go as far as to argue that in some cases people might be better off in a status of

anarchy, than in any kind of weak institutional regime structure (Duffield 2002, Leeson and Williams 2008).

External critiques of the root cause research and policy agenda largely make two arguments. Firstly, national aggregations of the outbreak of civil war do tell us little about violence in civil war (escalation and de-escalation). Second, war and large scale violence (especially in the mid and long-term) does fundamentally transform societies and political orders, and these new forms of organization need to be taken in account for designing policies (rather than orienting policies at a pre-conflict state).

In a major contribution Stathis Kalyvas (2006) has argued that to explain violence one must look at the personal and local level rather than on the national. Kalyvas suggests that if one looks at the personal and village or town level motivations and incentives, the causes suggested by studies on the national level are rather meta-narratives. Narratives that justify violence, but do not cause it. These narratives (such as ethnical or economic ones) are important in mobilizing violence. In consequence policies directed at preventing a reversion of violence must look at the local level and personal and community motivations.

That civil wars transform societies and economies as well political orders is a well known fact, as Charles Tilly (1988) classically argued the contemporary European political order is the outcome of a collective experience of violence and warfare. In other words, the transformations caused by civil wars are not necessarily negative, but also provide opportunities. Yet, orienting intervention at the pre-conflict state (the causes of the war) does lead to a relative neglect of how violence has transformed a country.

3.5 Summary: The Limits of Knowledge

In sum, existing social scientific knowledge about whether fragility and conflict presents a considerable source of global threats and what causes conflict and fragility is uncertain and contentious. Policies relying on gross generalizations can be counter-productive. Yet, current policy development also shows that more tailored, analytically based, country-oriented approaches are being taken. It is these initiatives that we want to review next, and sketch the persistent dilemmas inherent in these responses.

4. Re-organizing security and development policies

In this section we discuss the major policy responses to the security-development nexus. Those responses can be differentiated in, architectural responses – the re-organization and maintenance of new bureaucratic infrastructures –, emergency responses policies – tools developed to cope with situations that have identified as emergency situations –, long-term structural policies directed towards prevention and re-construction – policies in post-conflict situations, situations that are on the verge of the outbreak of conflict, and policies towards countries which are in a long-term violent state.

How far current policies have departed from a one size fits all strategy? In what way do current policies lead to a more technocratic, mechanistic thinking or towards a case-sensitive pragmatic thinking? Secondly, we address the questions raised in the beginning, in how far can we see in current policies a trend towards a prioritization of security or of development? Is there a tendency to subordinate development policies under security concerns? Or can we conclude a process of developmentization of security policies?

4.1 New architectures

An Overview

A wide range of actors from academia, think tanks, international organizations, non-governmental bodies and governmental agencies have been active in developing toolkits for integrating security and development. In the following, we limit our discussion to the approaches of the main donor agencies, namely the approaches take by the governments of the UK and the USA, by the European Union (EU) and Commission (EC) and by the World Bank (WB) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which have been very active in developing strategies and doctrines.

OECD

Recognizing the limits of policies of development conditionality in the context of fragility and seeing the need for continuous engagement in these countries, OECD set up in 2003 a Fragile States Group within the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

The focus of the group is on analysis as well as donor coordination, the improvement of the effectiveness of aid effectiveness, and the delivery of services in states referred to as "difficult partnerships", meaning largely primarily those states emerging from violent conflict. The Group's main emphasis lies on policy coherence and coordination among agencies active in the fields of security and development. Centrally the OECD has produced a set of "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States". These documents emphasize the necessity of joined-up action among political, economic, security, and development actors at the local, national, regional, and multilateral level. The Group has explicitly addressed questions of counter-terrorism policies (OECD/DAC 2003) and the security-development nexus more broadly (OECD/DAC 2005).

World Bank

With a similar motivation as OECD, and a surprisingly similar approach being taken (Debiel et al 2007:7), the World Bank has become one of the major actors in developing doctrines and strategies for contexts of fragility. Crucial has been the task force on "Low Income Countries Under Stress" (LICUS). The LICUS group foregrounds that "state-building is the central objective in fragile states, and that effective donor programs require integrated approaches across the political-security-development nexus".

Recognizing that development has been become increasingly conditional, which leads donor countries to withdraw from countries which need assistance the most, the Group aims at preventing neglect towards these countries and fostering a continuing engagement with them. By cooperating with other international actors such as the OECD, the UN, the EU, and bilateral donors, the initiative seeks to promote donor harmonization and the development of joint assessments and strategies, while raising awareness to the constraints of low capacity in fragile states.

Central in the debate has been the World Bank's research programme on "The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence" seeking to understand the origins of organized violence. Directed by economist Paul Collier, the team comprises of economists as well as security analysts. The main approach taken by this analytical unit is a statistical and economic one, in focusing on factors such as reliance on a primary products, the proportion of young men education, factionalism, lack of political rights or economic inequality.

US government

The US government has launched several initiatives that aim at integrating security and development. Central has been here the idea of 3D (Defense, Development and Diplomacy), of integrating the different available foreign policy toolboxes.

Interagency coordination of conflict prevention and post-conflict-reconstruction is conducted by the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was established within the Department of State in August 2004. The office includes representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, the CIA, and the military's Joint Staff. Based on the Iraq experience (Sovacool and Halfon 2007), the Department of Defense has defined what they call stability operations as a "core U.S. military mission" that will have priority comparable to combat operations. In 2006 the US started the restructuring of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with the objective of strengthening coordination and alignment between U.S. foreign and development policy. This shift aims to consolidate authority over the budgeting, planning, and implementation of all State and USAID foreign aid programs within one office (US Department of State and USAID 2003, USAID 2005).

UK government

The UK was one of the first governments aiming at integrating security and development through their so called "joined-up" government approach. The central achievement of this approach was the establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001. These Pools aim at integrating the expertise of the different ministries and provide common funding for them. In September 2004 a Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established (UK 2004), which is since 2006 fully operational. The PCRU is tasked with (a) improving civilian-military links in planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction policies and (b) strengthening coordination between the U.K. and other international actors.

The EU

Also the EU has played a visible leadership role in finding integrated and coherent responses. These institutions are embedded within the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Within the Commission, the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit was established in 2001 as part of DG External Relations. The purpose of the Unit is to coordinate the Commission's conflict prevention activities, integrating conflict prevention into the programming of EU foreign aid, overseeing a Rapid Reaction Mechanism that provides quick and flexible funding in urgent pre and post-conflict situations, and maintaining contact with key international actors such as the United Nations, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and international financial institutions.

Within the Council, a number of bodies and committees has been established, the Political and Security Committee, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Directorate-General for Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination, the Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). These units aim at coordinating civilian conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, strengthening civil-military cooperation, and centrally providing forums for consultation and coordination among EU member states.

The objectives stated in the 2010 Headline Goal and 2008 Civilian Headline Goal (in the framework of ESDP) outline the priorities of enhancing multifunctional crisis response capabilities, fostering civil-military cooperation, and strengthening interoperability among the civilian and defense capabilities of Member States. The November 2005 "European Consensus on Development" similarly underscores the EU commitment to improve coordination among EU donors internally and externally, as well as coordinating with the security policies of the EU. The statement underlines the need for development policy to focus on the problem of state fragility and conflict prevention, by providing support for governance reforms, rule of law mechanisms, anti-corruption measures, and the establishment of viable state institutions.

Coordination mechanisms

Although these initiatives do not entail major organizational restructuring or high level budget shifts, they imply that much international activity has been spend on developing administrative and operational integration mechanisms and analytical responses for linking security and development. The word coordination appears over and over in the debates about security and development. This is not surprising since coordination has been well-identified long ago as one of the taken-for-granted, but ill-defined, notion of sound planning (Wildavsky 1979, 131-132). The absence of major reforms and reliance on clear frameworks has caused some doubt among analysts if the

initiatives taken represent more then lip service and extended beyond symbolic reforms (Chandler 2007, Youngs 2008, Lockhart 2005).

Coordinating instruments and their effects on policymaking and coherence, being a relatively novel policy instruments, have only spurred relatively little empirical research so far. Richard Young's (2008) study suggests that coordination in the EU has only had little impact on policy practice, both in terms of mission practice, as well as donor practice. The reasons he identifies in the mutual misunderstandings between security and development actors, as well as in the relative abstract (rhetorical) level on which coordination operates. The guidelines of the EU, have neither specified the complexities of the development–security link or given many clues on how this is to be articulated in practice (Young 2008: 421). In relying on several interviews of both security and development actors, he suggests (Youngs 2008:422) that Policy Coherence for Development measures "appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the development and security communities against each other".

Chandler (2007) and Paris (2006/8), both arguing from the perspective of a peacebuilding framework, point out that coordination instruments largely operate on a rhetorical level. Chandler goes as far as to suggest that coordinating instruments are a masquerade for inaction:

> "It often appears that at the institutional level it is preferable to engage in internal re-organization, 'reorganizing the desk chairs', with the claim to be taking a policy issue seriously, than it is to actually engage with the policy area itself." (Chandler 2007:371)

Paris (2006/8) corresponds to this point in suggesting that coordination cannot replace action by all involved, and hence should be evaluated as one of available measures, which is necessary but not sufficient. In other words, something like a 'coordination bubble' has been developed, in which coordination is relatively detached from concrete difficult situations and practice. Such a viewpoint is supplemented by other studies, which have largely concentrated on the UN. As it is observed, the analytical and operative branches often do not communicate very well, and very often operative people hesitate to take into account analytical work (e.g. Bebbington et al. 2004).

Chandler points to another problem of the emphasis of creating new organizations, the problem of responsibility:

> "the more coordination there is between domestic and international policy actors, the less policy responsibility lies with any one of them, and there has been no shortage of experimentation in this area" (Chandler 2007: 370)

For Chandler the mere idea of coordinating the security-development nexus is one by which the different agencies want to escape their responsibility in a field where a high uncertainty exists of what can or should be done. Paris, being less critical to the ideas of coordination and coherence as such, sees one of the crucial mistakes in current

conceptions of coordinating organizations that they assume that it is already known what needs to be done. Yet, as he argues, and we suggested in section three, this is hardly the case and consequently organizational responses need to put much more emphasis on researching what needs to be done, prior to coordinating the activities of specialized agencies.

The critiques raised in the studies of Young, Chandler, Paris and others (Jones (2002), Herrhausen (2007), de Coning (2007)) echo the results of the wider literature on coherence and coordinating government approaches.

Carbone (2008) investigating policy coherence in EU development policy stresses that coherence is a relational term, meaning that policies will be considered as coherent from one perspective (let's say trade), while less so from another (let's say fishery).

Other studies even suggest that coordination instruments can lead to a further fragmentation of governance as instruments hide value conflict. For instance in his analysis of city strategic partnerships, a coordination instrument at the local scale, Davies (2009) reveals that coordinating institutions establish only a shallow consensus over abstract goals, at the same time legitimating the avoidance of political value conflicts and in turn causing fragmented governance.

As these studies suggest, there is no clear indication that current coordination initiatives have led to either a subordination or prioritization of security or development policies, because coordination has not been functioning well. Yet, the studies suggest that there is indeed a drift towards a standardization, given that the coordination mechanisms aim at developing guidelines and strategies for measurement. Given the weak relations between coordination bodies and actual everyday on the ground practice, there seems however enough space for context specific solutions.

4.3 Emergency policies

A large portion of the policy discussion and novel institutions has centered on how to respond to complex emergencies, humanitarian disasters and the outbreak of large scale violence. In the ESDP framework this has been the creation of crisis response mechanisms, as well the creation of early warning institutions. Indeed the question of how to prevent emergencies and how to cope with humanitarian catastrophes has been at the roots of linking security and development measures. To events of the 1990s have been of special significant: The failure to re-act to the Rwandan genocide and the role of humanitarian agencies in allowing the re-armament of rebel forces in the refugee camps of eastern democratic Republic of Congo. Second, the events of Srebrenica, the failure of peacekeeping forces to protect refugees in safe zones in the Bosnian War. While the question of when to and how to intervene in complex emergencies constitutes a debate in its own right, one part of the debate has spurred notable controversy between development and security actors: The question of the role of humanitarian agencies in (post-)conflict situations and their relation to military organizations.

Humanitarian and military agencies

At the heart of the dilemma of the relation between humanitarian and military actors are the following observations

- Humanitarian actors cannot engage if minimum security conditions are not met, as, in the case of ongoing violence, humanitarian actors might become the target of violence. High level of insecurity for aid workers reduce the amount and quality of aid provided (Harmer 2008: 535).
-
- Humanitarian activities can have counter-productive consequences for a conflict (Anderson 1999, Goodhand 2002). Relief can help to re-organize violent groups or provide them with resources, and the aid delivered can become part of the resource struggles of a conflict itself. A sudden massive amount of aid runs risks of exacerbating conflicts, and these resources may become incentives to fight rather than a stimulus for peace.
-
- Military actors have in recent years increasingly engaged in humanitarian activities (Huysmans 2002, PRT) either in protecting refugees, as in the case of Kosovo, or as part of larger Hearts and Minds strategy and counter-insurgency tactics.
-

The responses to these observations have been the suggesting of "do no harm rules", following Mary Anderson's (1999) proposal on the one side, and on the other, increasing attempts to coordinate humanitarian and military actors on the ground.

The "do no harm rules" have for instance found into OECD DAC Principles of Good Engagement in Fragile States. As OECD DAC (2007:1) outlines:

> "International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity."

As argued by OECD DAC, and in Anderson's (1999) original proposal development and humanitarian actors must engage in a careful analysis how which humanitarian measure fuels into conflict, and whether they increase or decrease societal divisions, which are at the heart of a conflict or can lead to re-newed outbreak of a conflict. As Anderson suggests what possibly constitutes these divisions is highly context-dependent, analysis has hence to operate on a local level, not a national one. Yet, the do no harm

rules put a high pressure on aid agencies as well as donors to engage in sound political and conflict analysis, raising the question of analytical capabilities. Existing studies suggest that the overall quality of analysis is relatively poor (e.g. Cliffe and Luckham 1999).

The coordination of humanitarian and military components of a mission, such as in the framework of the UN concept of "integrated missions" (following the proposal of Brahimi), is an attempt to better organize the relation between military and humanitarian actors, but also to use available resources more efficient and in a more transparent way. Integrated missions have been implemented in the operations in Sierra Leone, Burundi, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo .The EU in itself has not formulated an explicit integrated mission framework itself, given that it primarily engaged so far in the framework of the UN.

Integrated missions have spurred considerable concerns among humanitarian actors and point to two further trade-offs of coordination and integrating security and development. The first concern is that integrated mission put humanitarian actors at risk. Given the main capital of humanitarian actors is their impartiality (not taking sides in a conflict), it is argued that being associated with a larger mission that also follows security and political objectives leads to a perception of local populations which sees humanitarian actors as political ones. The loss of impartiality makes humanitarian actors a direct target of violence. Yet, a major global survey organized by the British Oversea Development Institute finds these concerns unjustified. Harmer (2008) argues in summarizing the findings, that while there is an increase in violence towards aid workers, no direct relation between an integrated mission and the number of violent incidents can be identified.

A second issue concerns, questions of expertise. Implementing a coordinated framework of engagement de facto means or has meant so far that decision making power on how to channels resources has been moved to actors which are either detached from the needs on the ground or simply lack the knowledge on how to organize humanitarian action best. These concerns are similar to those we have discussed on a general administrative level already, the risk of creating a coordination bubble, where the solution might be found in more de-centralized systems of coherence (Mosse et al 2002).

4.4 Long term policies

While it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between emergency policies and long-term engagements, given that some states are in permanent emergencies and often the distinction is based on an act of labeling, it makes sense to distinguish between policies directed at long term and at short term implications. By long term policies we can understand these policies which are rather directed at issues of fragility than conflict, and which operate in an environment where a peace agreement has shown stable over time, major violence has been halted (such as in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Sierra Leone), or the outbreak of violence has been (due to internal processes or external intervention) prevented (such as in Kenya or Zimbabwe). As formulated in the OECD

Principles or in the EU Development Consensus the overall direction here has been to engage in Statebuilding understood as engagements to facilitate state infrastructures (e.g. capacity building, administrative reform), establish a state monopoly of violence (e.g. security sector reform) and in establishing neo-liberal market structures (e.g. through property regimes, social welfare programmes, unemployment policies or regulatory systems). While again the statebuilding discussion constitutes a debate in its own right, let us point to a problematique that arises in the relation of security and development policies, namely the relation between regime and human security.

Regime and Human Security – A trade off

Scholars relying on in-depth (and often ethnographic) analysis of conflict constellations and its political economy highlight another challenge, which indeed points us to a predicament of the security/development nexus. The starting point is here how people cope with and live in situations of conflict and extreme under-development. Duffield (2002) has suggested for these practices the term of "actually existing development".

"Actually existing development is what keeps people alive and maintains social and political life in the face of adversity and an exclusionary international system. It includes the networks, flows and nodes of the shadow economy as well as the emerging and reflexive political complexes that are associated with it. It is an arena of survival in which the potentialities of modernity are exploited to the full and, in the process, identities and authorities are continually reproduced and changed. Actually existing development has not arisen because of "official" development: it has emerged despite it." (Duffield 2002: 83)

The major difference in perspective compared for instance to the human security framework, is that the focus is not on the binary of the state/government vs. the people, but on considering the existence of different political units inside a state territory and how they organize political, social and economic life. This perspective is valuable insofar as it does not start with a normative evaluation of "good" and "bad" actors, nor does it consider the government in place as the only important political actor, or the state as the only significant social institution.

The point in case is that weak statehood is characterized by the competition of several political factions and their networks, while the government in place is only one of them, usually maintaining networks which do not exceed the capital and its immediate surroundings.

To provide an instance from the current policy debate: The former state of Somalia is now ruled by different political units, one of them being the government of Somalia, another being the rule in Somaliland, and yet another the piracy networks operating at the Northern borders (and often extending there influence over the Somalian border). As observed by Sanddorn (2009), the piracy networks do deliver what is described in development discourses as crucial public services: employment, health and indeed also

security, given that the pirate fleet started as a loose alliance of Somalian fishermen protecting their waters against foreign fishing vessels and environmental pollution. As it is highlighted by this case and others (such as the Afghanistan poppy networks, and other cases discussed in the nascent literature on warlordism), what might be threatening for one actor (the international community, or the state), might the most important source of survival and development for others.

Yet, pirates, smugglers, traffickers and other networks of the shadow economy are of course ambivalent units. As Duffield makes this point:

"The institutions and relations of actually existing development, through the extensive networks of the shadow economy, are able to keep millions of people alive. At the same time, they are just as capable of taking it away: in some cases, on genocidal proportions." (Duffield 2002: 86)

The reliance of people's survival on these networks not only poses a challenge for analysis –as a state-centric or government oriented view reveals little of these constellations and dynamics, but leads to a core predicament of the security/development nexus: The same networks that 'keeps millions of people alive' have been identified (as discussed above) as the major threats to global security and a fragile state. Fighting against these threats motivates and legitimizes international intervention in the first place. Yet constructing these networks as enemies, and accordingly fight them by military means, undermines the actual existing development and threatens the survival of people living under the auspices of these networks.

In sum, there is a trade-off between the security objectives of the fragile regime and global security concerns, and the development of people. The question is hence, which of these concerns should be prioritized. Following this line of reasoning, Leeson and Williamson (2008) go one step further in suggesting that populations in situations of fragility might be in the medium term better off without a state, given that the best solution the fully functioning state following the Western model is not available to fragile states. These research results suggest the importance of considering other political units than the state and directing policies towards other (inter-mediate) goals then building a functioning state.

4.5 Summary

In this section, we reviewed a number of policy problematiques, namely the administrative challenge of integrating security and development, the question of the relation of humanitarian and military actors in emergency responses, and the question how security concerns implied by state-building, might undermine the actually existing development guaranteeing the survival of people living under conditions of fragility. Rather than suggesting answers to these problematiques we aimed at carving out the tradeoffs. Administrative coordination mechanisms might lead to a coordination bubble. While there is no clear evidence that integrated missions put aid workers at risk, they might lead to a lack of expertise on humanitarian issues. Statebuilding policies, in turn,

might deteriorate the conditions of life for people in situations of fragility. Yet, our review does not lead to the conclusion that there is a clear tendency towards either a securitization or a developmentization of policies. However, there is a visible trend towards administrative procedures and bureaucratic solutions.

5. Conclusion

The calls for more coherence and a "whole of EU" approach as a consequences of the security development nexus suggest nothing less than a turn from a *European Development Policy* and a *European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)* towards a *European Security and Development Policy*. Yet, as we suggested this is not only difficult to achieve – despite the institutional reforms necessary to do so, which we did not address in this paper – but also not necessarily productive.

In the paper we developed our argument, by firstly suggesting that there are different positions on what the security-development nexus entails. We suggested that the nexus has been perceived as a conceptual chaos in which it is unclear what security or development is constituted of; positions that are concerned that development policies are subordinated under security objectives (securitization of development), or that clear security strategies become impossible due to the considerations of development objectives (developmentization of security). Moreover, the security development nexus has been perceived as a thinking tool to achieve greater coherence among foreign policy towards fragility and conflict, and as a policy agenda in which the major aim is to address the root causes of conflict. Following these different positions we firstly aimed at bringing some light in the conceptual debates of the security-development nexus. We suggested that no accurate or consensual definition of what constitutes development and security is most likely to be found. Instead we proposed a framework understanding development and security as means not as objectives and centrally adding transparency to the different claims of security and development by focusing on the referent objects these claims refer to. In the succeeding section we reviewed some of the major claims which are associated to the security development nexus,, and which can be summarized as the root cause agenda. We pointed out that to some degree we lack certain knowledge, and that policies better take flexible standpoints rather than betting on the cards, that polcies should aim at balancing cultural divisions, removing economic incentives for violence or establishing democratic regimes. Based on this discussion we review some policy problematiques and the political responses to them. We concluded that more integration is not necessarily better.

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